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Sean michael kerner beyondcorp
Sean michael kerner beyondcorp












  1. #SEAN MICHAEL KERNER BEYONDCORP PATCH#
  2. #SEAN MICHAEL KERNER BEYONDCORP REGISTRATION#
  3. #SEAN MICHAEL KERNER BEYONDCORP VERIFICATION#

"It provides a consistent basis from which approval authorities can draw information, resulting in quicker decisions and reduced, amortized overall cost," Wilson concluded. The RABET-V effort was launched in February 2020 as a pilot program and is available as an open source effort on github.

#SEAN MICHAEL KERNER BEYONDCORP VERIFICATION#

"RABET-V is an election technology verification process that supports rapid product changes by design," Wilson said. That's where the RABET-V: Rapid Architecture-Based Election Technology Verification framework comes into play. Going a step beyond best practices, there is also an ongoing need to verify that systems are in fact operating as intended on a continuous basis. Deployment of application layer filtering.Using best practices for securely handling input and output.

#SEAN MICHAEL KERNER BEYONDCORP PATCH#

Deployment of automated software patch management tools.That's a critical area for non-voting election system integrity, as an unauthorized change can throw an election into doubt.Īmong the key recommendations that Wilson provided to reduce the risk of unauthorized data modification are the following: The third key area is something Wilson referred to as unauthorized data modification. Email Author: Other Articles by this Author. Wilson said that both DoS and ransomware attacks are essentially about availability and denying access to assets. Sean Michael Kerner is a senior editor at, the news service of the IT Business Edge Network, the network for technology professionals. Ransomware is also a risk that election officials need to defend against. "If you can take a service down in a moment of critical need it can have significant impact." "Denial of Service is concerning because you know exactly when to wage the attack against an election system," he said. The first is dealing with Denial of Service (DoS) risks. There are three key areas that Wilson suggested election officials should look at. The overall goal, according to Wilson, isn't necessarily that every election official will do all the steps, but rather they will have a guide that provides questions to ask vendors and IT staff. The Center for Internet Security has developed a guide to help secure those non-voting election systems that has 160 best practices to help reduce risk and improve confidence. "There is a lot to that attack surface, but there are not a lot of standards and regulations," Wilson said.

#SEAN MICHAEL KERNER BEYONDCORP REGISTRATION#

Those systems include electronic poll books, election night reporting systems, voter registration systems, and electronic ballot delivery. While voting machines are important, so too are non-voting election technologies, which was the topic of a session at the RSA Conference in San Francisco.Īaron Wilson, Senior Director of Election Security at the Center for Internet Security (CIS), explained that non-voting election systems include things that support elections. There has been a lot written in recent years about election security and ensuring the integrity of voting systems.














Sean michael kerner beyondcorp